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Abstract
This paper measures inflation persistence in Colombia for the period 
1990-2010 and estimates the implied speed at which agents learn about 
the central bank’s inflation target. We estimate Erceg and Levin’s (2003) 
imperfect credibility model using Bayesian techniques and compare 
the posterior odds of this model against a conventional Neokeynesian 
model with ad-hoc price indexation. The odds are strongly in favor of 
the imperfect credibility model, suggesting that lack of credibility on the 
inflation target is an important source of inflation persistence. We use 
the model to compute the sacrifice ratio associated to 100 basis points 
inflation target shocks and find that it is (0.83%) in line with previous 
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estimates for Colombia. We also find that the speed at which agents 
learn in the model has increased, albeit marginally, since the central bank 
implemented its inflation targeting strategy. Although during this period 
macroeconomic volatility has fallen, inflation persistence has remained 
roughly constant suggesting that, so far, the impact of those credibility 
gains on inflation persistence has been modest.
 
Key words: Credibility, inflation, persistence, disinflation costs, 
Colombia.
jel classification: C52.
Resumen
En este artículo se mide la persistencia de la inflación en Colombia para el 
período 1990-2010 y se estima la velocidad implícita a la cual los agentes 
aprenden sobre la meta de inflación. Estimamos un modelo de credibi-
lidad imperfecta, como el empleado por Erceg y Levin (2003), utilizando 
técnicas bayesianas y comparamos la probabilidad de este modelo frente 
a un modelo neokeynesiano convencional con indexación de precios 
ad-hoc. Las probabilidades favorecen fuertemente al modelo de credi-
bilidad imperfecta, lo que sugiere que la falta de credibilidad en la meta 
de inflación es una fuente importante de la persistencia inflacionaria. 
Usamos el modelo estimado para calcular la tasa de sacrificio asociada 
a choques de 100 puntos básicos a la meta de inflación y encontramos 
que esta es de 0,83%, en línea con estimaciones previas para Colombia. 
Se encuentra además que la velocidad a la cual los agentes aprenden 
en el modelo se ha incrementado, aunque marginalmente, desde que el 
banco central implementó la estrategia de meta de inflación. Aunque 
durante este período la volatilidad macroeconómica ha disminuido, la 
persistencia de la inflación se ha mantenido prácticamente constante lo 
cual sugiere que, por ahora, el impacto de las ganancias en credibilidad 
sobre la persistencia de la inflación ha sido modesto. 
 
Palabras clave: credibilidad, inflación, persistencia, costos de desin-
flación, Colombia. 
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Introduction
Inflation is a persistent process. For long, this fact has called the 
attention of researchers and policy makers because it has important 
economic and policy implications. For instance, the central bank’s 
policy response can vary depending on the degree of persistence 
of inflation shocks. If inflation shocks have short-lived effects, the 
monetary authority could react mildly to them, and inflation would 
stabilize soon around a given target, without much impact on cred-
ibility and macroeconomic volatility. However, if persistence is errone-
ously underestimated, delays in response to inflationary shocks could 
create relatively large deviations from the central bank’s objectives, 
undermine the credibility of the central bank and create additional 
instability.
Fuhrer (2009), in a comprehensive survey on the persistence of infla-
tion, shows that even though it constitutes a key feature of inflation 
dynamics, its definition and measurement are controversial. The study 
provides a “taxonomy” of the body of research on inflation persistence 
and distinguishes “reduced-form persistence” from “structural persis-
tence”. The first refers to an empirical property of inflation without 
economic interpretation. The second refers to persistence that arises 
from identified economic structures that produce it. Fuhrer surveys a 
variety of methodologies to measure inflation persistence, from the 
estimation of simple autocorrelation functions to sophisticated filtering 
techniques, and concludes that regardless of how inflation persistence 
is defined and measured, it has declined somewhat in recent years. 
However, it is still a subject of debate how much it has declined.
Colombia has not been immune to this debate. The majority of local 
studies are econometric studies that characterize inflation persistence as 
some measure of the degree of “mean-reversion” of the inflation rate. 
To our knowledge, Birchenall (1999) is the first effort in Colombia to 
characterize inflation dynamics (See Table 1). Using data for the period 
1965-1996 he finds that the estimate of the autoregressive component 
of the consumer price inflation is 0.6. Thus, the study characterized 
inflation as a persistent stationary process. More than ten years later, 
Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2009) use a similar approach (the 
sum of the estimated coefficients of an autoregressive process) and 64
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find similar results for Colombia (0.67), but using a larger sample for 
the 10 largest Latin American economies, albeit for a shorter period 
(2000-2006).
More recently, Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010a) and Echavarría, 
Rodríguez, and Rojas (2010b), following the recent international 
literature, measure inflation persistence with the relative contributions 
of the permanent and transitory components of inflation; they argue 
that the adoption of inflation targeting in 1999 caused an important 
reduction in mean and variance, but has not significantly modified the 
persistence of inflation.
Table 1.  Recent estimates of inflation persistence in Colombia.
 Authors   Methodology 
 Estimated 
Persistence 
 Sample
 Birchenall 
(1999) 
A recursive estimation of the autoregressive com-
ponent of cpi inflation is carried using data from 
1965 to 1996 as an additional exercise to analyze 
inflation dynamics in Colombia. 
 0.6   1965-1996
 Capistran 
and Ramos-
Francia 
(2009) 
Econometric estimation of inflation persistence 
for the 10 largest Latin-American economies is 
done using univariate time-series methodologies 
and monthly data from 1980 to 2006. Estima-
tion is also carried by sub-samples, selected by 
episodes of change in monetary policy regime. 
Reported inflation is the sum of autoregressive 
coefficients obtained using 2000-2006 sub-
sample. 
 0.67   2000-2006:06
 Echavarría 
et al. (2010a) 
Estimation of inflation persistence in Colombia 
is carried using monthly data form cpi inflation 
between 1990 and 2010 and several econometric 
methods including Markov-switching models 
and state-space models. Reported persistence is 
the estimate from the MSIAH model. 
 0.34   1990:1-
2010-6
 Echavarría 
et al. (2010b) 
An unobserved components model with regime-
switching is used to estimate persistence, as a 
second order autoregressive process, and struc-
tural breaks for several inflation indexes using 
quarterly sample ranging from 1979 to 2010. 
Reported persistence is the mean of the sum of 
autoregressive coefficients for the 1989-1999 and 
1999-2010 sub-samples. 
 0.31   1979-2010
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Indeed, Colombia used to be a country of high and volatile inflation. 
At the beginning of the nineties the newly independent central bank 
(Banco de la República), began announcing end of year inflation targets 
along with other explicit targets for other macroeconomic variables, 
like the nominal exchange rate1. These targets should guide monetary 
policy in order to meet the Constitutional mandate of achieving price 
stability. Although no long-run inflation target was set, central bank 
officials publicly claimed that their goal was to reduce inflation to a 
“single digit”. In 1991, in line with other central banks around the 
world, Banco de la República established its first quantitative infla-
tion target of 22%.
The disinflation process was long and gradual. The bank missed its 
inflation target for 6 years in a row. It was until 1999, in the midst of 
a mayor financial and economic crisis, that inflation reached a single 
digit. Later, inflation declined steadily (but slowly) from about 9% 
in 1999 to about 5% in 2005. Nowadays, after the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, Colombian inflation is under control and within a 2-4% 
inflation target range. With this record at hand in such a prolonged 
period, one can easily guess that credibility has not been one of the 
main assets of the central bank (see table 2). Thus, it is natural to think 
that lack of credibility may be one factor behind the persistence of 
inflation. 
The hypothesis that lack of credibility on monetary policy is a source 
of inflation persistence which, in turn, determines the sacrifice ratio is 
not new. For instance Ball (1994), in a seminal contribution, showed 
that imperfect credibility can raise the output costs of disinflation. 
Also, Sargent (1999) argued that the decline of US inflation persistence 
during the 90’s has been associated with an increase in the credibility 
of the monetary policy, in the sense that inflation expectations have 
been anchored at a low level and so they are unlikely to adjust to 
temporary increases in the inflation rate. Erceg and Levin (2003), in 
another influential paper, studied the episode of the Volcker disinfla-
tion in the US using a model in which agents learn about the ultimate 
intentions of the central bank. The paper calibrates a standard stag-
gered contracts Neokeynesian model to the US economy and finds 
1  A crawling band was implemented during the first years of the 90s. 66
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Table 2.  Credibility and inflation targeting in Colombia.
   Observed   Expectation   Target   Mistake   Surprise   Anchoring   
 Year   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)-(3)   (1)-(2)   (2)-(3)   Credibility
 1997   17.68   18.45   18.0   -0.32   -0.77   0.45   
 1998   16.70   17.95   16.0   0.70   -1.25   1.95   
 1999   9.23   15.789   15.0   -5.77   -6.56   0.79   
 2000   8.75   9.89   10.0   -1.25   -1.14   -0.11   33.0
 2001   7.65   8.85   8.0   -0.35   -1.20   0.85   46.9
 2002   6.99   6.95   6.0   0.99   0.04   0.95   69.1
 2003   6.49   6.58   5.5   0.99   -0.09   1.08   16.1
 2004   5.50   6.13   5.5   0.00   -0.63   0.63   70.4
 2005   4.86   5.78   5.0   -0.14   -0.92   0.78   79.0
 2006   4.48   5.23   4.5   -0.02   -0.75   0.73   90.1
 2007   5.69   4.50   4.0   1.69   1.19   0.50   25.9
 2008   7.67   4.14   4.0   3.67   3.53   0.14   6.3
 2009   2.00   4.65   5.0   -3.00   -2.65   -0.35   53.1
 2010   3.17   5.22   3.0   0.17   -2.05   2.22   93.8
Note: “Expectation” refers to the end-of-year inflation forecast made by banks and brokers in 
January of each year, according to the Inflation Expectations Survey of the Banco de la República. 
“Credibility” refers to the percentage of surveyed people which believed (at the beginning of the 
year) that the inflation target would be met that year.
Source: Banco de la República, Colombia. 
that the cost of the Volcker disinflation was 1.6 percentage points for 
each percentage point reduction in the inflation rate2. This number is 
similar to other results found in the literature for the US. The authors 
show that their results are consistent with the idea that most of the 
inflation persistence found in the US inflation data is attributable to 
lack of credibility instead of adaptive expectations. Later, Kozicki and 
Tinsley (2005) examined the financial market implications of shifts in 
the inflation target. Using a time-series model of the term structure, 
they showed that failure to account for imperfect policy credibility 
2  Typically, staggered contracts models have been criticized for not being able to reproduce 
the observed inflation persistence present in the data. Many modelers use tricks to induce 
persistence, like adding lags. One of the main implications of Erceg and Levin work is that 
inflation persistence is not only an inherent characteristic of the economy, but also that it 
can vary with the stability and transparency of the monetary policy regime.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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may explain empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis of the 
term structure of interest rates.
This paper asks whether lack of credibility on the central bank’s 
inflation target could have played an important role in explaining the 
persistence of inflation observed in the Colombian data at business 
cycle frequencies. To that end, we define the concept of persistence 
and use an econometric model to measure it. The econometric model is 
able to capture the low frequency fluctuations of the inflation rate and 
confirms the results found by Echavarría et al. (2010a) and Echavarría 
et al. (2010b) that the conventional measure of inflation persistence has 
not changed significantly in the last decade. Despite this, our results 
allows us to infer (heuristically) that the importance of persistent 
shocks to inflation relative to transitory shocks has diminished.
Our main contribution is that we are able to identify, through an 
economic model, the sources behind inflation persistence. We 
follow Erceg and Levin (2003) and use their imperfect information 
model to understand them. We compare it against the conventional 
Neokeynesian model with inflation indexation. Following Schorfheide 
(2000), we use Bayesian analysis to discriminate between them. We 
compute the posterior odds and find that the Colombian data supports 
the lack of credibility model.
We also use the model to estimate the speed at which agents learn about 
the ultimate intentions of the Colombian central bank. We find that 
credibility has been higher after the central implemented the inflation 
targeting strategy by the end of 1999. In addition, we estimate how 
conventional estimates of the monetary policy rule changes when the 
central bank lacks full credibility on its commitment to reduce infla-
tion. To our knowledge, this joint estimation of the monetary policy 
rule under imperfect credibility is another new result for Colombia.
In light of these results, we proceed to calculate the sacrifice ratio 
implied by the imperfect credibility model. The estimated sacrifice 
ratio (0.83%) for the full sample is in line with those estimated previ-
ously in the literature by Gomez and Julio (2000), Reyes (2003), 
Sarmiento and Ramírez (2005), but higher than those obtained by 
Hamann, Julio, Restrepo, and Riascos (2005) for Colombia, and 
Hofstetter (2007) for the average of 18 Latin American countries in 
a 30-years sample.68
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Table 3.  Sacrifice ratios for Colombia and Latin America.
 Authors   Methodology   SR Estimate   Period
Gomez and Julio 
(2000) 
Econometric estimation of a set of equations 
describing the transmission mechanisms of 
monetary policy for Colombia using quarterly 
data from 1990Q1-2000Q1. The sacrifice ratio 
is calculated as the accumulated loss in the 
output gap after a shock of permanent reduction 
of annual inflation in 1%. 
0.79%  Simulated 
Scenario
Reyes (2003)  Identification of different disinflation periods in 
Colombia and estimation of the sacrifice ratio 
during each one using the standard methodol-
ogy of Ball (1994) and alternative methodolo-
gies of Zhang (2001) and Cecchetti and Rich 
(1999). SR estimate corresponds to the result 
obtained using Zhang’s method for the latest 
period analyzed. 
0.89%  1991-2001
Sarmiento and 
Ramirez (2005) 
Estimation of a monetary SVAR with short-
run restrictions as in Buiter and Miller (1981). 
Estimates of the SR are the average difference 
of the steady-state product gap with and without 
inflationary shocks for the period 1998-2003, 
obtained from the historical decomposition of 
estimated shocks. 
0.88%  1998-2003
Hamann et al. 
(2005) 
Simulation of a small open economy DSGE 
calibrated for Colombia. Calculation of costs 
of reducing the steady state inflation rate from 
5.5% to 3% from the transition dynamics simu-
lated after this permanent shock. 
0.04%  Simulated 
Scenario
 Hofstetter (2007)   Identification of disinflation episodes between 
1973 and 2000 for 18 Latin-American Countries 
and estimation of average SR for each of the 
three decades composing the sample using three 
alternative methodologies. Results show a nega-
tive disinflation cost for the 1990-2000 period 
under all methodologies. Results reported are 
the average of this period estimate under the 
LL&L methodology. 
 -0.57%   1990-2001
What percent the current output has to fell from its long run level, due to a reduction of 1% in 
trend inflation. 
The rest of paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we describe 
the main facts about inflation persistence in Colombia for the period 
1990-2010. Then, in section II, we describe the model. In the fourth 
section we briefly present the estimation procedure. In the fifth section 
we report the results. In the sixth we compare the two models while in 
the seventh we compute the sacrifice ratios under imperfect credibility. 
The last section concludes.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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I.  Our measure of inflation persistence
Standard measures of persistence such as the sum of the autoregres-
sive coefficients, the spectrum at zero frequency and half life are 
all concepts that assume convergence to a constant mean3. Marques 
(2004) argues that measures of inflation persistence should be based 
on a time varying mean as it may reflect exogenous factors such as 
inflation drivers and/or the inflation target. In fact, Levin and Piger 
(2004), Corvoisier and Mojon (2005) and Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) 
show that persistence in some European countries has been stable 
when computed over small samples or when the mean of inflation 
is allowed to change. Furthermore, Echavarría et al. (2010a) find 
similar evidence for Colombia. In these papers inflation persistence is 
measured as the sum of the autoregressive coefficients in a linear model 
that allows for breaks in mean. The number of breaks and the break 
dates are estimated using either Bai and Perron (1988) or Altissimo 
and Corradi (2003)4.
In line with this strand of the empirical literature, to characterize the 
evolving changes in the mean of inflation, we use the following state-
space model: 
  y x t t t =  +   (1)
x x t t t = 1 3 ρ ν − +
µ β µ ν t t t t = 1 1 1 − − + +
β β ν t t t = 1 2 − +
3  There are other approaches to measure inflation persistence, like the estimation of the auto-
correlation function and unit root tests, to mention just two of them. Recently, in Colombia, 
Echavarría et al. (2010a) compare different measurements of statistical persistence and 
estimate the evolution of inflation and inflation gap persistence in Colombia for the period 
1990-2010 using a regime switching model and a Kalman filter.
4  Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2007) and Cogley and Sbordone (2009) stress the impor-
tance in econometric models of inflation of recognizing the low frequency movement of 
inflation. They called it “trend inflation”.70
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 with ν σν it i N  0,
2 ( ), i =1,2,3 and E[ ]= 0   it js  for i j t s ≠ ≠  and  . Equation 
(1) decomposes the inflation process into a evolving mean component 
and the fluctuation around it. The latter component is defined by the 
stationary AR(1) process x x t t t = 1 3 ρ ν − +  where ∈ − ( 1,1) forms a persis-
tence measure. The trend component is given by t and its specifica-
tion resembles the standard local linear model. The model (1) can be 
easily estimated using Kalman filter and the standard error decomposi-
tions. See Harvey (1990), West and Harrisson (1999) and Durbin and 
Koopman (2001) for details. The advantage of (1) compared to other 
approaches is that trend and persistence are modeled simultaneously 
rather that sequentially5.
We use alternative indexes to measure inflation. One is the percentage 
change of the seasonally adjusted quarterly Consumer Prices Index 
(cpi). In addition to cpi inflation, we present results for the following 
inflation rates: CPI NF −  that excludes food from the cpi, CPI T −  and CPI NT −  
that includes only traded goods and non traded goods, CPI R −  with only 
regulated goods and  CPI B −  that excludes food and regulated prices 
from the cpi. The sample consists on quarterly data for the period 
1988:1 to 2010:4.
We report the results in Table 4 and Figures 2 to 3. These results confirm 
that most measures of inflation display an important amount of persis-
tence at the business cycle frequency. The only exceptions being the 
inflation of regulated goods; for which the estimated trend component 
of inflation follows closely the observed inflation, so deviations from 
trend quickly revert to the mean, and non-traded sector, which displays 
a low persistence, compared with the other measures6. Notwithstanding 
this, most measures of inflation display high persistence.
5  A similar model has being used by Clark (1987, 1989) to decompose the us real gdp between 
trend and cycle
6  One explanation could be that price formation in the non-traded sector could be better 
anchored to the inflation target. The non-traded sector comprises mainly service oriented 
businesses and construction firms. Real activity in this sector was depressed during the 
financial crisis and relative prices adjusted quickly. During the crisis the central bank 
tightened monetary policy to defend the exchange rate band and so, tighter monetary 
policy was associated with a significant real exchange rate depreciation (i.e. a collapse in 
the relative price of the non-traded goods). We speculate that this event may have caused 
a price setting behavior that puts an important weight on inflation expectations. This is an 
open question.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
ISSN 0120-3584.
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
71
Table 4.  Estimated persistence for the different inflation rates.
   
CPI   
CPI-T  
CPI-NT   
CPI-NF   
CPI-R  
CPI-B  
 0.33   0.60   0.24   0.66   -0.02   0.84
 
To have an indication of how much inflation persistence has changed 
in the last years, we perform a one-quarter rolling-window estimation of 
the parameter  in the stationary AR(1) process  x x t t t = 1 3 ρ ν − +  of CPI  
starting in the third quarter of 1999 and ending in the fourth quarter 
of 2010. This period covers the inflation targeting regime. Figure 1 
shows the result.
Figure 1.  cpi inflation persistence - rolling window.
 
We confirm the findings in Echavarría et al. (2010a) and Echavarría 
et al. (2010b), which show that inflation persistence, measured as the 
component defined by the autoregressive coefficient has remained 
roughly constant. However, it is worth taking a look at the right panels 
of Figures 1 to 2. A visual inspection of these graphs show that the 
relative importance of permanent shocks to cpi inflation has declined 
(relative to transitory shocks), in particular for the period 2001-2007. 
Measuring this relative volatility accurately is very difficult. Thus, if 
we take this graphical analysis as an heuristic measure of persistence, we 
can cautiously say that inflation persistence has somewhat declined.72
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Figure 2.   Estimated t 
and xt: CPI, CPIT and CPINT inflation.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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Figure 3.   Estimated t and xt: CPIR, CPINF and CPIB inflation.74
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In the next section we use a model in which lack of credibility plays 
a key role in explaining inflation dynamics at the business cycle 
frequency.
II.    The model
Following Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), we consider a stan-
dard closed economy Neokeynesian model commonly used in many 
central banks. The main elements of the model are: a Phillips curve, 
an IS curve and a monetary policy rule, described through equations 
(2) to (4): 
π β π λ t t t t t E mc u = 1 + + +   (2)
y E y i E E g g t t t t t t t t t = 1 1 1 + + + − − + − ( ) σ π   (3)
i i y z t i t i t t y t t = (1 ) , 1 γ γ γ π π γ π − + − − ( )+ 


 +   (4)
where  t is the inflation rate,  t  is the inflation target, mct is the real 
marginal cost and it is the nominal interest rate. The variables gt and zt are 
a preference and a policy shock respectively, which we later describe. 
An important element of the model is the variable ut, which represents 
the present value of private agents error when forecasting future 
inflation and distinguishes this model from a standard Neokeynesian 
model. As we will see later, this variable captures the deviation of the 
Phillips curve under imperfect information with respect to the perfect 
information. The expectation operator Et denotes the rational expec-
tation of private agents if they use all available information at time 
t. The parameters of this set of equations are:  λ
α βθ θ
θ α ε
=
(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ( 1))
− − −
+ −
 
where  is the share of labor factor in production,  the probability of 
keeping prices fixed during the period, ε the elasticity of substitution 
between slightly differentiated types of goods and  ∈(0,1] the discount 
factor.  measures the slope of the Phillips curve.  > 0 is the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution and γπ, y and i measure the degree of 
responsiveness of the monetary authority to deviations from target, 
the output gap and past interest rate, respectively.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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The rest of equations of the model describe the technology, the marginal 
cost, the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage:
y a n t t t = (1 ) + −    (5)
 
mc w n y t t t t = + −   (6)
 
mrs y n g t t t t =
1
σ
η + −   (7)
 
w mrs t t =   (8)
where yt is output, at is a productivity shock, nt is the number of hours 
worked, wt is the real wage per hour and mt is the marginal rate of 
substitution. Finally,  is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply 
to the real wage.
The exogenous variables of the model evolve according to the 
following stochastic processes: 
a a t a t t
a = 1 ρ ε − +  
g g t g t t
g = 1 ρ ε − +
zt t
i = 
where each of the innovations  
j follows a normal distribution with 
zero mean a standard deviation   j j a g i  for   = , , . We assume that the 
innovations are uncorrelated with each other.
When information about the inflation target is perfect,  t is known 
for all t. The interesting case is when information is not perfect. As 
proposed in Erceg and Levin (2003),  t varies over time due to a 
combination of a white noise shock, t
q, and a shock t
p with persistent 
effects on the inflation target. The central bank’s reaction function is 
observable to agents, but the underlying components of the inflation 
target are not. Therefore, private agents must solve a signal extraction 
problem to infer the components of t.76
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In this model, the central bank’s inflation target is the sum of a constant 
steady-state of inflation   and two zero-mean stochastic autore-
gressive components,  t
p and t
q. The former is assumed to have an 
autoregressive root close to unity while the later is assumed to have a 
much smaller autoregressive root. That is, the inflation target evolves 
according to the following process: 
     t t
p
t
q − − + = ( )   (9)
where the time-varying components follow the first order vector 
autoregression: 
π π
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We can write equations (9) and (10) in state-space form defining 
Zt t
p
t
q = ,
'
   −    , F p q = , diag   ( ) and  H =[1,1]. In particular, the state 
equation 
Z FZ t t t = 1 − + 
represents equation (10).
Households and firms are assumed to use optimal filtering to solve 
this signal-extraction problem; this requires the inflation-target inno-
vations t
p and t
q to be mutually uncorrelated, with variances vp and 
vq respectively, and to be uncorrelated with any other shocks in the 
economy. With these assumptions, the Kalman filter can be used by 
private agents of the economy to obtain optimal estimates of the unob-
served components through the following recursion: 
E Z FE Z L HFE Z t t t t t t gain t t t = ( ); = 0, , 1 1 1 1 − − − − + −  
where K FL gain gain =  is the Kalman gain matrix and Lgain determines how 
agents respond to the forecast error,  t t t HFE Z − − − 1 1, by updating their 
estimates of the underlying components of the inflation target. There-
fore, given the current estimate E Z t t of these components, the optimal 
forecast of the inflation target j periods ahead is given by: 
E HF E Z t t j
j
t t   + + =
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For simplicity, Erceg and Levin (2003) assume  q = 0 and p =1. Thus, 
the households and firms expectations of the future inflation target 
depend only on a constant  and the expectation of the highly persis-
tent component of the target. Specifically, the persistent component 
of the inflation target evolves according to: 
E E E t t
p
t t
p
t t t ( ) = ( ) ( ). 1 1 1 π π π π κ π π − − + − − − −   (11)
So, agents update their assessment of the persistent component of 
inflation target by the product of the forecast error innovation and the 
Kalman gain parameter, .
Returning to Equation (2), ut is the present value of the forecast error 
of private agents in the prediction of future inflation, that is: 
  u E t t t t = 1 1 β π π 
+ + − ( )  (12)
where  
t+1 is the rational forecast of inflation at t + 1 given all infor-
mation available to private agents at time t, obtained by the optimal 
filtering process given by Equation (11). By replacing (12) in (2) we 
can see that in the case of ut = 0, we obtain the standard Neokeynesian 
Phillips curve, representing the case of perfect information. If there 
are discrepancies between private agents expectations under imperfect 
information and perfect information then ut ≠ 0. So, ut will contribute 
to inflation persistence in the case in which private agents do not have 
perfect information about the evolution of the inflation target.
We can use Equations (12) and (2)-(4) to derive the following expres-
sion for the evolution of ut: 
u u t t t
c = (1 ) (1 ) 1 − + − − κ κ ε  
where  is the Kalman gain parameter from Equation (11) that deter-
mines the speed at which agents learn to distinguish between the two 
components of the inflation target, and t
c is a normally distributed zero 
mean shock with standard deviation c, associated with the shocks to 
the permanent component of the inflation target. Notice that in the 
case of full information,  =1, agents learn at the highest possible rate, 
implying ut = 0 and therefore  Et t t   + + 1 1 =  .78
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Of particular interest is the value of the learning parameter . We are 
interested in assessing the information contained in the data about 
the speed at which agents have learned during the disinflation period 
using a standard Neokeynesian model augmented by learning about 
the inflation target. Unlike Erceg and Levin (2003), where parameter 
 is calibrated from survey data, we estimate it using this simplified 
version of their model and Bayesian methods. The advantages of 
estimating models using a Bayesian approach are discussed formally 
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). A review of the Bayesian tools for 
macroeconomists is presented in An and Schorfheide (2007).
III.   Bayesian estimation
One of the advantages of estimating economic models using a Bayesian 
approach is that we can incorporate additional information on param-
eters through the use of priors. To perform the Bayesian estimation of 
each model we follow Schorfheide (2000) and proceed in five steps 
which we summarize briefly. First, for a given set of parameters, we 
solve the model using Klein’s (2000) method to find the state transition 
equation. The solution defines the way in which the system evolves 
around the deterministic steady state. The state-space representation is 
completed by adding a measurement equation to the model dynamics. 
The next step consists on computing the likelihood through Kalman 
filtering and to combine it with the prior distribution of the param-
eters to get the posterior density. Draws from the posterior density 
are obtained using the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 
as described in Schorfheide (2000). The algorithm is started at the 
posterior mode or some point nearby with a high probability density, 
found by numerical optimization. In this section we report the data 
used in the estimation, our priors and estimation results.
A.   Data
We seek to explain the behavior of inflation, output, nominal interest 
rate and real wages. We use quarterly HP-detrended data from 1990:1 
to 2010:4. As a proxy of the nominal interest rate we use the interest 
rate on 90-day certificates of deposits. Our inflation measure is the 
quarterly (annualized) growth rate of the cpi. Output is measured as 67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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the real gdp and real wages are measured using the manufacturing 
industry real wage index from Banco de la República.
B.   Priors
Let d y i w t t t t t = , , ,  ( ) denote the observed data and define the vector of 
parameters to be estimated as Φ
σ
η θ κ γ γ γ ρ ρ σ σ σ σ π =
1
, , , , , , , , , , , , i y a g a g i c

 

 . 
We impose strong priors on ,  and ε. We set   = 0.98, which implies 
a real annual return close to 4%. To replicate the labor factor compen-
sation share in real gdp we set   = 0.36. The elasticity of substitution 
of the good produced by intermediate firms, ε, is set to 6, which is a 
standard value in the literature7.
As explained in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), there is an identifi-
cation problem in the model between the probability of adjusting prices 
and the elasticity of substitution. That is,  and ε cannot be identified 
separately. In order to circumvent the identification problem we choose 
to estimate  for a given markup, since the estimated parameter tells us 
about the implicit frequency at which firms adjust prices in Colombia. 
Several studies, including Misas, López, and Parra (2009) and Bonaldi, 
González, and Rodríguez (2010), suggest that Colombian firms set 
prices every one or two quarters; we choose a beta-prior distribution 
for  with mean 0.36, which is the value estimated in Bonaldi et al. 
(2010) baseline model and implies that firms set prices every 4 or 5 
months, on average.
The prior distributions for the rest of the parameters in vector  are 
reported in Table 4. For the Taylor rule coefficients we use the priors 
that are commonly used in the literature: γ γ π =1.5 = 0.125  and    y . We use 
a normal distribution for both with standard deviations of 0.25 and 
0.125 respectively. There is little evidence about the elasticity of labor 
supply to the real wage in Colombia; we use the estimates obtained in 
Prada (2010) as priors for the estimation of the inverse of labor supply 
elasticity () and the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity 
(). Evidence for the US shows that the value of  is higher than 1 but 
7  We use strong priors for  and  because the model does not have capital and so the likeli-
hood does not have information for their estimation.80
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not much larger than 2. However, evidence for emerging markets shows 
that it should be between 2 and 5. For all autoregressive parameters 
we use a uniform prior between [0,1) and, for all standard deviations 
of shocks, an inverse gamma distribution with mean 0.01.
As for the credibility parameters, results for the US suggest that  is 
around 0.13. Nevertheless, we use an uniform distribution as a prior 
which accounts for the lack of evidence regarding the value of this 
parameter in emerging countries and Colombia, particularly.
IV.   Results
We use a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw four 
chains of 200.000 draws from the posterior distribution of  and 
construct the estimates for each parameter using half the draws of each 
chain. The acceptance rates for each chain were between 0.3 and 0.4. 
We use methods developed by Brooks and Gelman (1998) to monitor 
the convergence of the posterior draws estimates8. Estimation results 
are shown in Table 5.
The data supports the idea of lack of credibility as , the speed at which 
agents learn in the economy, is different than one and closer to zero. So, 
we can reject the hypothesis of perfect credibility. Our findings show 
that the posterior mean of the speed of learning is   = 0.19, while the 
estimated probability of keeping prices fixed during a quarter is 0.29, 
lower than the estimate obtained for the full-credibility model (0.37). 
We argue that this is due to imperfect credibility, which captures the 
persistence of inflation more closely than the standard model.
8  The results of this exercise are available upon request.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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Table 5.  Prior and posterior distributions: Imperfect and full credibility.
   Prior distribution   Posterior distribution
       
 Imperfect credibility 
model 
 Full credibility 
model
Parameter   Distribution   Mean 
Std 
Dev 
 Mean 
HPD-90 
Interval 
Mean 
HPD-90 
Interval
1

 Gamma  2.3 0.5 5.38 (4.27 - 6.44) 5.05 (3.96 - 6.17)
   Gamma  3.2 0.5 3.40 (2.62 - 4.11) 4.15 (3.31 - 5.04)
   Beta  0.36 0.02 0.29 (0.26 - 0.32) 0.37 (0.34 - 0.40)
  Uniform [0,1)  0.5 0.29 0.19 (0.07 - 0.32)  -  -
  Uniform [0,1)  0.5 0.29 -  - 0.84 (0.66 - 1.00)
 
i Uniform [0,1)  0.5  0.29  0.11 (0.00 - 0.22)  0.17  (0.04 - 0.29)
 
γπ    Normal  1.5  0.25  1.97 (1.68 - 2.24)  1.60  (1.31 - 1.89)
y    Normal  0.13  0.13  0.14 (-0.07 - 0.34)  0.22  (0.02 - 0.42)
 a   Uniform [0,1)  0.5  0.29  0.48 (0.38 - 0.59)  0.47  (0.33 - 0.62)
g   Uniform [0,1)  0.5  0.29   0.65 (0.58 - 0.74)  0.72  (0.64 - 0.80)
a   Inv. Gamma  0.01   0.008 (0.006 - 0.009)  0.009 
(0.007 - 
0.01)
g   Inv. Gamma  0.01   0.05 (0.04 - 0.06)  0.05  (0.04 - 0.06)
i   Inv. Gamma  0.01   0.028 (0.02 - 0.03)  0.026  (0.02 - 0.03)
c  
Inv. Gamma  0.01   0.01 (0.008 - 0.01)  - -
        940.06  746.71
For the policy rule parameters, we find a the posterior mean response 
to inflation of γπ =1.97, to the output gap of y = 0.14 and a smoothing 
desire of i = 0.11. The response to inflation differs from our priors, 
that were set accordingly to the Taylor principle. Our results show 
an active central bank when responding to deviations from long run 
inflation and a passive one when responding to output. This result is in 
line with recent theoretical developments of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2004). They find that social welfare increases when the central bank 82
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only responds to inflation. However Bernal (2002), using a classical 
approach to estimate Taylor rules in a partial equilibrium model for 
Colombia, finds that γπ =1.34,  y = 0.19 and  i = 0.10. We interpret 
our results as supporting the idea that, given the lack of credibility on 
monetary policy during a large part of the sample, the response of the 
central bank to inflation has to be higher than in environments with 
higher credibility.
The 90% highest-posterior density interval (hpd) for the intertem-
poral rate of substitution coefficient () is of (4.27 – 6.44). The point 
estimate is 5.38, which lies in the upper end of the estimates obtained 
for the Emerging Market economies in the International Macroeco-
nomics literature. The high values of the estimates of the coefficient 
of intertemporal rate of substitution reflect the higher variability of the 
macroeconomic time series typically found in Emerging Markets.
We also obtain an estimation of the labor supply elasticity. The poste-
rior mean of  is 3.4., implying a labor supply elasticity of 0.29, which 
is in line with the results of Prada and Rojas (2010), who estimate the 
Frisch elasticity in Colombia for the period 2001-2006 obtaining a 
value of 0.31.
The rest of the parameters are the autocorrelation and standard devia-
tions of the shocks (productivity, preferences, monetary policy and 
the target shock). There is a significant amount of persistence in the 
productivity and preference shocks, the posterior mean of their auto-
correlation coefficients are 0.48 and 0.65, respectively, with a standard 
deviation of 0.72 percent and 4.86 percent. The posterior mean of the 
volatility of the interest rate rule shock and the inflation target is 2.8 
percent and one percent, respectively. We attribute this high value of 
the target shock to the period of high and volatile inflation in Colombia 
that characterized the first part of our sample.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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Figure 4.   Prior and posterior distributions. 84
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We perform an additional exercise to assess the impact of inflation 
targeting on the estimated speed at which agents learn about the 
inflation target. We split the sample in two periods: one from 1990 
to 2000 and the other from 2001 to 2010. The break corresponds 
(approximately) to the date in which we think inflation targeting was 
implemented (by the end of 1999).
Figure 5.   Estimated speed of learning   for pre- and post-inflation tar-
geting periods.
 
The graph shows a faster speed of learning for the post inflation 
targeting sample. Also notice that the full-sample estimated value of 
 is closer to the value obtained for the first sample, the years before 
inflation targeting. Most of the information in the data appears to be 
concentrated in that part of the sample. This suggests that there have 
been credibility gains in the last ten years.
The previous result is interesting and intuitive. We interpret the faster 
learning rate, measured by a higher Kalman gain, as increased credi-
bility because agents “learn” to distinguish between permanent and 
transitory shocks at a faster pace. In an inflation targeting regime the 
central bank announces its inflation target to guide the agents inflation 
expectations. If there is full-credibility observed inflation converges 67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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faster to the inflation target. If there is imperfect credibility agents have 
to “discover” the movements of the inflation target. Nonetheless, the 
fact that inflation persistence has fallen, albeit not significantly, suggests 
that the impact of those gains on inflation has not been large.
Figure 6.   Imperfect credibility model: Smoothed shocks. 
Yet, the model reveals one important fact of the Colombian busi-
ness cycle. A quick inspection of the smoothed shocks obtained in 
our estimation, displayed in figure 6, shows that the variability of all 
shocks is lower since the end of 2000, close to the date in which the 
inflation targeting regime was implemented9. In this sense we could 
argue that the implementation of IT in Colombia is associated with 
a higher degree of macroeconomic stability. This result is consistent 
with our finding of the previous section that the relative importance 
of permanent shocks has diminished in the last few years.
In the next section we compare the lack of credibility model to a stan-
dard Neokeynesian model with ad-hoc inflation indexation.
9  See figure 5. The inflation targeting regime starts from position 50 in the graph.86
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V.  Model comparison and inflation persistence
The Neokeynesian model is a standard model in many central banks. 
To induce inflation persistence many modelers introduce ad-hoc 
indexation but keep the perfect information assumption. We estimate 
such a model by replacing equation 2 with:
π φπ φ π φ t t t t t E mc = 1 1 2 1 3 − + + +  
Where  φ
ν
νβ
1 =
1+
, φ
β
νβ
2 =
1+
, φ
λ
νβ
3 =
1+
 and  is the degree of price 
indexation to past inflation10. We use the same priors for the estimated 
parameters in order to compare the performance of the imperfect credi-
bility model against the conventional model. Table 4 reports the results 
of the estimation of the Neokeynesian model with price indexation.
To compare the two models we perform a posterior odds test. The 
posterior odds ratio is the ratio of the posterior model probabilities. 
Consider the two models Mp and M i with two associated parameters 
p and i where p refers to the model with perfect information and 
i refers to the model with imperfect information. Both models were 
estimated using the sample YT. The fit of each model m p i = , , is given 
by its marginal density of the data p YT m M ( ). We compute the marginal 
density of the data conditioned on the model: 
p Y p p Y d T m
m
m m T m m m M M M ( ) ( ) ( ) ∫ = ,
Θ   
 
by integrating out the parameters m from the posterior kernel. Using 
Bayes theorem, we can compute the posterior distribution over models 
as: 
p Y
p M p Y
p M p Y
m T
m T m
m p i
m T m
M
M
M ( ) ( )
( ) ∑
=
( )
( )
= ,  
10  We use an uninformative prior for the estimation of this parameter, as in Rabanal and 
Rubio-Ramírez (2005).67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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where p m M ( ) is the prior that we have on each of the models. So, the 
posterior odds ratio is:
 p Y
p Y
p p Y
p p Y
i T
p T
pi T i
o T o
M
M
M M
M M
( )
( )
( )
( )
=
( )
( )
.
 
If we had the same prior on each model, the posterior odds ratio is the 
ratio of the marginal likelihoods: 
F
p Y
p Y
p i
T i
T p
, =
M
M
( )
( ) 
also known as the Bayes factor. As the Bayes factor gets larger, the 
higher the support for model M i.
We find that p YT i M ( ) = (940.1) exp  while p YT p M ( ) = (746.7) exp  implying 
a log-Bayes factor around 193, so that the odds are strongly in favor 
of the imperfect credibility model11.
One interesting result of this exercise is the impact of the imperfect 
information assumption on the estimation of the degree of stickiness 
in the economy. According to the literature on inflation persistence, we 
can identify three sources of inflation persistence: extrinsic, intrinsic 
and expectations-driven. The first can be associated with the coefficient 
that accompanies the real marginal cost, , in the New Keynesian Phil-
lips curve (nkpc), equation (2). The second with the lagged inflation 
term. The third, in a full information model, with the inflation expecta-
tions term, while in an imperfect credibility model we can associate 
the degree of persistence with parameter .
To analyze the degree of extrinsic persistence the key parameter is 
the probability of keeping prices fixed during a quarter. Recall that 
in the imperfect information model this probability is 29 percent, 
implying price changes, in average, every 1.4 quarters. In the full 
information model with price indexation this parameter value raises 
11  We use the Laplace approximation to compute the posterior marginal density.88
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to 1.5 percent implying price changes every 1.54 quarters. It seems 
that the assumption of price indexation coupled with full information 
tends to increase the degree of extrinsic persistence by lowering the 
responsiveness of inflation to the real marginal cost12.
The degree of intrinsic persistence is similar in both models. Although 
we did not estimate parameter  in the imperfect credibility model, 
its value, obtained in the estimation of a full information model, is 
very similar.
Finally, the expectations-driven persistence on the full information 
model is closely linked to the intrinsic one through the discount factor, 
while in the imperfect information model is determined by parameter 
. Our results show that this is our main source of inflation persistence 
in Colombia. Agents learn at a relatively slow pace. Compared to the 
US disinflation period, our rate is more than one-fourth times the rate 
at with agents learn in the US. We could associate this result to the 
inflation target policy that the central bank follows in Colombia which 
has allowed anchoring inflation expectations to a long run inflation 
target.
The estimation of the policy rule is consistent with this idea. The 
responsiveness of the central bank to deviations of inflation from target 
is higher under imperfect credibility than under full information and 
price indexation. This means that the central bank has to exert more 
effort when it faces a lack of credibility problem than when it faces 
a price indexation problem. In the next section we use the model to 
estimate how costly has been to disinflate without anchored expecta-
tions.
VI.   Disinflation costs
How large have been the disinflation costs under imperfect credibility 
in Colombia? One way to answer this question is to use the estimated 
model and compute the “sacrifice” (in terms of the output gap) of 
12  To see this we draw from the distribution of parameter  and find that its mode on the case 
of price indexation is 0.098, while in the case of imperfect credibility is 0.274.67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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reducing the inflation target by 100 bp. We also compute the effort of 
monetary policy in terms of the increment of the policy rate.
Under full credibility, a central bank can disinflate at little or no output 
cost. By relaxing this assumption, the disinflation cost depends on the 
degree of credibility of the monetary authority. In the model, agents 
learn gradually about the permanence of the target shock. So, the 
speed at which agents learn provides a natural measure of the degree 
of credibility of the central bank. If agents learn quickly the disinfla-
tion process will resemble the perfect credibility case. The slower 
the speed of learning the greater the output costs and the effort of 
monetary policy.
Given the estimated speed of learning, we compute the macroeconomic 
effects of a 100 bp disinflation focusing on the sacrifice ratio and the 
monetary policy effort. We measure the sacrifice ratio as the present 
value of the output gap during the disinflation period. To measure the 
monetary policy effort we compute the present value of the nominal 
interest rate gap during the disinflation period. Both present values 
depend on the discount factor used. In the estimation of the model 
we used a 0.98 discount. We vary this parameter between 0.95 and 
0.99 to check the sensibility of our measurement of the sacrifice ratio 
to the discount factor used. Table 6 reports the sacrifice ratio and the 
monetary policy effort under alternative discount factors.
 
Table 6.   Disinflation costs and monetary policy effort (basis points).
   
   0.95   0.96   0.97   0.98   0.99
Sacrifice ratio   75   77   80   83   86
Policy effort   134   138   144   149   155 
 
In the benchmark estimation, a 100 basis points shock to the inflation 
target requires the central bank to keep interest rates by nearly 150 bp 
above average generating a sacrifice of 83 bp in output. The effects of 
the disinflation shock takes about three to five years to dissipate. In the 
model, to effectively reduce inflation in 100 bp a shock to the target of 
equal magnitude is not enough. The central bank needs to exert more 
effort in order to reduce inflation in 100 bp effectively.90
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This sacrifice ratio is in line with those estimated previously in the 
literature by Gómez and Julio (2000), Reyes (2003), Sarmiento and 
Ramírez (2005), but higher than those obtained Hamann et al. (2005) 
for Colombia, and Hofstetter (2007) for the average of 18 Latin 
American countries in a 30-years sample.
 
Figure 7.   Response to a decrease of the inflation target under imperfect 
credibility.
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The differences with respect to these last two papers arise from the type 
of model and estimation techniques used. With respect to Hamann et 
al. (2005), it is well known that Neokeynesian models without strong 
ad-hoc persistence (as the one used in that paper) exhibit small sacri-
fice ratios. With respect to Hofstetter (2007), as the author explains, 
the negative sacrifice ratios arise from a unique set of conditions that 
occurred in Latin America during the period 1990-2000.
The sensitivity of our result depends on the discount factor used 
compute the present value of the cost in terms of output. Using a 
discount factor of   = 0.95, the disinflation cost falls to 75 bp. Interest 
rates have to be 134 bp higher on average during the disinflation 
period.
More importantly, to gauge the impact of the degree of imperfect 
credibility on the sacrifice ratio, we can use the model to compute the 
disinflation cost under alternative values of , the speed of learning 
parameter. Notice how the larger the  the smaller the disinflation 
cost and the lower the effort of the central bank. Previous empirical 
evidence, like Boschen and Weise (2001), finds that more credible 
disinflations are associated with smaller sacrifice ratios. Thus, the 
model used in this paper provides a rationale to explain why higher 
central bank’s credibility leads to lower output losses during disinfla-
tions.
Figure 8.   Output and interest rate gaps after a decrease of 1% in the 
inflation target.92
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VII. Final remarks
This paper asked whether lack of credibility on the central bank’s 
inflation target could have played an important role in explaining the 
persistence of inflation observed in the Colombian data at business 
cycle frequencies. To answer that question we used a state-space 
model which decomposed the inflation process into a time-varying 
mean component and the cyclical movement around it. The model 
was estimated using the Kalman filter; the results obtained confirm the 
findings by Echavarría et al. (2010a) and Echavarría et al. (2010b) that 
inflation persistence has not changed significantly in the last decade. 
Despite this, we argue that our results allows us to infer (heuristically) 
that the importance of persistent shocks to inflation relative to transitory 
shocks has diminished. We take this as indirect evidence that inflation 
persistence has somewhat declined during the disinflation process.
More importantly, we were able to identify, using Erceg and Levin’s 
(2003) model, the sources behind inflation persistence. We estimated 
and tested that model against the conventional Neokeynesian model 
with inflation indexation using Bayesian analysis and showed that the 
posterior odds supports the lack of credibility model.
As a by-product of our estimation, we obtained estimates of the 
monetary policy rule of the central bank under imperfect credibility 
on the inflation target. We find that the central bank reacts more to 
inflation, less to output and smooths less the policy rate in comparison 
to the standard Neokeynesian model under full-credibility and ad-hoc 
inflation indexation.
We then obtained estimates of the speed at which agents learn about 
the ultimate intentions of the Colombian central bank. We found that 
credibility has been higher after the central bank implemented the 
inflation targeting strategy by the end of 1999. Thus, we interpret 
these results as evidence that the credibility of the central bank has 
increased and has reduced inflation persistence but those gains have 
been modest. Why this happens is an important open question for 
future research.
Finally, we calculated the sacrifice ratio implied by the imperfect 
credibility model and found a sacrifice ratio of 0.83%, in line with 67 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2011, PP . 61-97.
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those previously estimated in the literature. The model presented here 
and our estimation techniques could also be used to perform counter-
factual experiments for policy analysis, like: what would have been 
the sacrifice ratio had the central bank’s credibility been higher? If 
more transparency increases the central bank’s credibility, policies 
that increase the bank’s transparency could entail smaller losses in 
aggregate output during disinflation periods. The framework presented 
here sheds some light to answer and quantify this type of questions. 
This is a topic for future research.
The model can also be extended and/or adapted along different 
avenues to answer different questions. One simple modification is to 
consider other non-observable variables, like potential output. Usually, 
the economy is hit by productivity shocks that can be transitory or 
permanent. Agents (as well as economic authorities) face the challenge 
to learn about these shocks and consequently, take actions. Such an 
environment should display different outcomes and policy actions 
than those observed in economies in which agents can distinguish 
perfectly between transitory and permanent shocks. Another extension 
is to modify the model to a small open economy model and use it to 
answer a wide range of policy questions related, for instance, to the 
duration and/or observability of external shocks and how their nature 
affect the economic performance of the economy. We also leave these 
issues for future research.
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